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The EMU Threat
European Monetary Union may seem miles and years away.
But don't let it sneak up on you.
By Simon Boughey
ay 30 wasn't a day like any other at Johnson Controls. Treasurer Ben
Bastianen was considering a fairly standard transaction-a five-year deutsche
mark/ French franc swap that could lower interest costs for the global manufacturing
company by picking up an initial 200 basis points of positive carry. But
he realized that the outcome of the deal could be considerably different
than expected if European Monetary Union begins as currently scheduled on
January 1, 1999. "It's a wild card," says Bastianen. He concedes
the effect of EMU on the swap would probably be negative. But eventually
he did the deal anyway because a shorter-dated swap wouldn't have picked
up enough carry.
Bastianen isn't alone in flying blind into EMU. But whether U.S. bankers and treasurers like it or not, European currency union has now achieved
a political momentum which may make it very hard to stop. Much as Frankfurt
seems a long way away if you're a treasurer in Des Moines, Iowa, a long
position in deutsche mark forwards can make it a lot closer. The U.S. regulators,
accounting standards bodies and the legal profession haven't taken much
notice of EMU so far. But a few big U.S. corporates with debt outstanding
in EMU-affected currencies have rewritten their offer documents to accommodate
the possibility of monetary union.
The problems fall into several categories: legal, accounting, tax and
financial impact. The scramble to sort out the contractual implications
of EMU is just beginning, but issues like the possibility that contracts
can simply be terminated upon EMU make end-users of all sorts quiver. The
accountants haven't really considered the issue and the tax authorities
may take a look once they realize that some hitherto untaxed transactions
may become taxable. But for financial impact, it's clear. EMU is a minefield,
and for end-users that haven't taken the possibility into account for transactions
that extent beyond January 1, 1999-be they swaps or bond issues-there will
be a cost impact, and it is more likely to be negative than positive.
Few economic concepts have seemed more illusory and few have had such
a checkered history as EMU, but the so-called Eurocrats are very unwilling
to relinquish the dream of currency union, perhaps as the first and most
important step to full political integration. It now seems very unlikely
that something will not happen.
Much as American bankers and end-users of derivatives might like to think that the event does not concern them, they are going to have to face up
to reality pretty quickly. Any payment flow in any of the 12 currencies
will be affected.
D-Day 1999
At present, it is intended that the Euro be introduced on January 1,
1999, the beginning of the so-called Phase Three of currency union, as the
single currency for the 12 member countries of the European Community. It
isn't clear which of the 12 currencies will actually join. The British hate
the idea of EMU, the Germans are very skeptical, and the Danish rejected
the whole idea nearly four years ago. But for whichever countries and currencies
join, all payments in respect of securities and transactions will be payable
in Euros at the conversion rate of one Euro for one ECU, a basket of the
twelve currencies that is not used as currency itself. That, at least, is
the projected schedule. For one indication of how seriously the Europeans
take the issue, just look at derivatives activity this summer: the three
financial futures and options exchanges in London, Paris and Frankfurt were
bustling this August, traditionally a sleepy time. Volume on the London
International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) was up 82 percent
in August over the same month last year, a rise attributed partly to jitters
about EMU.
Europeans, as one might expect, are watching developments more keenly
than players in the U.S. Stephen Greene, an ISDA board member and chairman
of the City of London Joint Working Group, says: "If this were simply
a political exercise, monetary union would be a certainty. But it isn't.
The trick is whether they (the politicians) can make the economic constellations
line up to their political expectations." He adds that the crucial
question is whether France and Germany will be able to meet the economic
convergence criteria specified in the Maastricht Treaty without fudging
the results.
Damned if you don't
Of course, the likelihood of the Euro actually becoming the single currency for the 12 member countries of the European Community is really beside the
point. Banks and companies must take steps to prepare for it, because if
it does take place and they are not prepared, disaster will ensue.
Even within the last few months, the pace of activity has quickened significantly, notes Jeffrey Golden, an attorney with Alan & Overy in London. In June
the European Commission made significant progress toward establishing a
legal framework for the single currency, and legislation is currently being
considered. On June 12 the Marché à Terme des Instruments
Financiers (MATIF) announced the formation of a study group to examine the
likely impact of a single currency upon the Paris futures market. Its March
and June 1999 three-month PIBOR futures will already close on a settlement
price determined from a Euro three-month interest rate. Europe's biggest
futures exchange-LIFFE-is making energetic plans to cope with EMU, claims
chairman Jack Wigglesworth. Its Euromark, short sterling and Eurolire futures
contracts already contain single-currency provisions.
Progress on this side of the Atlantic has been rather less marked. This, of course, is understandable. But U.S. banks have been quite wrong in thinking
that this is an exclusively European issue. Nearly 100 percent of all swap
contracts between U.S. counterparties, irrespective of the currency in which
the deal is made, are governed by New York law. Perhaps half of all derivatives
contracts are governed by New York law. The ISDA Master is governed by New
York law. Consequently, New York law will have to be prepared to deal with
the issues arising from European Monetary Union. "This is not some
obscure European issue," says Greene. "The New York courts will
be called upon to resolve continuity of contract problems, as will courts
in every major financial center around the world. The only question is whether
people really understand the dimensions of the potential problems raised
by EMU."
The big worry concerns continuity of contract. It is feared by many market participants that their counterparties will regard EMU as sufficient grounds
to terminate outstanding agreements, and there are three principal areas
of confusion. Firstly, the contract may be assumed to have been frustrated
because its actual terms have radically changed. For example, say a U.S.
end-user with operations in Frankfurt has bought a deutsche mark/French
franc forward to hedge imports of French machinery, and it has purchased
this contract from a U.S. bank based in London. On January 1, 1999 the contract
will convert to what is essentially a fixed annuity rather than a forward.
Either counterparty might claim that as the contract is no longer an FX
forward, it has been frustrated.
The second problem concerns the type of provision concerning force majeure that appears in the Master Agreement. Generally, contracts say that if,
through no fault of the counterparty, some event occurs which prevents payment,
it may be considered terminated. This clause is seldom invoked, but a counterparty
may claim that EMU constitutes force majeure and take it to the courts.
Vanishing prices
Finally, and most intractably, says Greene, is the issue of disappearance of the price source. Say our two counterparties enter into a fixed deutsche
mark versus floating French franc currency swap. On January 1, 1999, not
only will the currencies disappear, but the floating rate on which the French
franc payments are based-say TAM or TAG-may disappear as well. "No
one tells you what to do if the floating rate price source disappears and
is not replaced," warns Greene. "Market practice has yet to be
established. People are working hard to identify the alternatives. Unless
the market comes together on this, the possibility of disputes is very real."
There are additional issues: in the case of the French franc/deutsche
mark FX forward, once the payments are converted to the Euro and it becomes,
in essence, a fixed annuity, does it become taxable? How should it be accounted
for? These are issues that the IRS and FASB need to decide. Equally, after
conversion, a swap payment could now be considered a loan, in which case
the capital treatment would be different. The banking regulators need to
sort out the answer here. Then there are the so-called "plumbing"
questions, concerning such niggling, but important, issues as different
day-counts and rounding conventions.
None of these questions are unsolvable. Answers, tried and tested by
market practice, can be found. But the point is that some direction needs
to be provided by the courts and the regulators before currency union takes
effect if lengthy and costly legal battles are to be avoided. As yet, however,
progress has been limited. Halsey Bullen, project manager at the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) admits he could see how "it [currency
union] will be a problem" for financial accounting, but confesses,
"I don't think anyone here or at other standard-setters overseas has
given the slightest thought to it."
IRS shrugs shoulders
A spokesman for the IRS in Washington sang a similar tune. He says that
no particular preparations had been made for tax treatment of transactions
that change in character once currency union has taken effect. The general
policy of the IRS, he explains, is not to anticipate events but to respond
to them when they have taken place: "I don't think that we would really
attempt a decision on issues that haven't happened yet. We do address taxpayers'
problems when they are real ones, not hypothetical." Yet observers
say that as New York law governs perhaps half the swaps transacted in the
world, the effect of union upon tax treatment is enormous.
The Federal Reserve Board is also adopting a "wait and see"
policy. "We will take it as it evolves. We are monitoring developments
and making adjustments as changes become clear," says a senior official
in Washington. The Fed is not making any changes until the market itself
changes and until that time it is not making any fundamental plans. The
official adds that most of the changes relate to what he calls accounting
and stationary issues, and reiterates that "we can't do very much with
regard to this until it happens." Neither did the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) give any firm idea of how it would treat bank capital
requirements when currency union becomes a fact.
U.S. banks and end-users that have either swaps or debt outstanding in
a European currency have been a little more alert to the potential ramifications
of currency union. Two years ago the Wall Street Committee on Transition
to European Monetary Union was formed by Niall Lenihan, a partner with Davis
Polk & Wardwell, a New York law firm, to look at these issues and the
impact they will have on U.S. courts and banks. Lenihan declined to comment,
on the grounds that "the Committee has not yet made any definitive
recommendations." It hopes to publish a comment early in the autumn.
However, a source close to the committee agrees that U.S. lawyers and
bankers are at last beginning to come around to accept the idea that this
was an event that might actually happen-and one that would involve them:
"There was skepticism last year," he says. "It was an issue
which people did not think they needed to concern themselves. But the turning
point was the point at the end of last year when they actually came up with
a name for the new currency. The mood changed after that." He adds
that interested parties are now phoning the Wall Street Committee on "a
consistent basis."
Swaps, Eurobonds and medium-term notes or loans are the transactions
that will affect U.S. counterparties the most. The question before the U.S.
is whether the problems can be decided by contract amendment or by legislation.
At the moment the European Council is drafting regulations to cover all
eventualities, and it seems that the U.S.
will probably follow its lead in introducing all-embracing legislation.
The advantage of legislation is that it would cover everything, whereas
contract amendments would differ according to the type of transaction being
executed. There would be much more potential for counterparties to claim
that certain contract amendments did not apply to their specific deal. Necessary
changes to legislation could be handled by the New York state legislature,
but it is not yet clear if Washington would wish to become involved in what
may be broad legislative changes to contract law.
Continuity clauses
Some of the biggest borrowers have begun to introduce continuity clauses to their debt offerings in European currencies. Unsurprisingly, General
Electric Capital Corporation (GECC), probably the biggest Eurobond borrower
among U.S. corporates, was the first off the mark. It now incorporates clauses
in all European currencydenominated offerings which say that if currency
union becomes a fact, all interest and principal payments after that date
are to be denominated in the Euro at the agreed conversion rate. So it would
be quite possible for an investor to receive coupon payments in lire in
August 1998 and then in the Euro in February 1999. McDonald's has also incorporated
continuity clauses, as have Morgan Stanley and the Republic of Italy for
their Eurobond transactions, which are governed by New York law. One source
estimates that there are perhaps a dozen U.S. issuers that have made similar
provisions.
Arbitrage obsoleted
One of the major objectives of GECC's overseas borrowing program is to
acquire low-cost debt through currency swaps of Eurocurrency issues. The
sub-LIBOR margins that can be achieved in some of the marginal currencies
like lire and pesetas are often quite substantial and can be in excess of
LIBOR less 30 basis points. If all currencies are subsumed into the Euro,
arbitrage possibilities will by definition be ironed out and borrowers like
GECC may be forced to look elsewhere for low-cost borrowing.
The World Bank admits it may have to look for low-cost borrowing outside Europe once the Euro becomes a fact, but is not prepared to speculate on
where that might be. "How EMU will affect arbitrage is difficult to
predict. Any prediction will be bold and hazardous," says Hans Rothenbühler,
director of the bank's funding operations department. With regard to its
swap business and bond offerings in currencies that are due to convert to
the Euro, Rothenbühler sees the World Bank following the decisions
of sovereign issuers. For example, the German government will decide how
to handle the transition from deutsche mark to Euro, and will thus provide
appropriate guidance for other DM issuers such as the World Bank. Therefore
from the perspective of the World Bank as a bond issuer, he does not "foresee
too much trouble."
ECU swaps and ECU bond offerings raise more complex issues, however.
Since the ECU is a basket of currencies and not legal tender itself, any
trade involving it has incorporated complicated substitution clauses which
might become subject to qualification and dispute, admits Rothenbühler.
For a number of years the World Bank has not faced these issues directly
since there were no issuance opportunities in ECU that met its funding targets.
If such opportunities were to arise in the near future, the Bank will look
carefully at the ISMA/ISDA recommendations that set market standards.
Bondholders neutral
"We have no view on whether EMU will happen or whether it will be
a good thing or not," says one major bond issuer. This sentiment could
apply to most U.S. institutions, whether they are end-users, banks, regulators
or courts. Clearly there are many unanswered questions and opaque areas
at the moment, and it is surely much easier to assume that currency union
won't happen, or that if it does then solutions can be found at the time.
But this may be a short-sighted approach. The U.S. is no longer isolated
from the world economy as much as it may think, and currency union will
affect many areas of its banking, particularly swap contract law. It might
be wise to find some answers before 1999, even if 1999 comes and goes and
there are still 12 European currencies rather than one.
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