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A Risk Management Umbrella for Investors
Since the G30 report of 1994, white papers on risk management have rained
out of the sky. Every conceivable authority has had some pronouncements
to make: bankers, regulators, accounting firms. Everybody except institutional
investors. This lacuna was corrected late in July when the ad hoc Risk Standards
Working Group gave birth to proposed standards for use in the investment
management process. A full text of the draft has been sent to 60 regulators,
institutional investors, broker-dealers, academics and exchanges for comments
and suggestions. After these comments are incorporated, a standard will
be released to the public domain, with copies available via the Internet.
The group consisted of thinkers from pension funds, insurance companies,
foundations and endowments. Mutual funds did not participate.
Why have institutional investors been mum so long? One reason, to be
sure, is that because they operate under ERISA or the Investment Advisor
Act they are much less actively regulated than other financial institutions.
Second, lacking a forum, many of the larger institutional investors quietly
grappled with risk management issues on their own. Third, a sense of urgency
didn't build until the respected Common Fund lost $138 million last year
because of inadequate risk management. Capital Market Risk Advisors, which
decided to be midwife to the collective effort, did much of the legwork
and organization that made it possible.
Broad reach
Since the package is under wraps at press time, it's difficult to judge
the contents, which cover 33 topics. But the Risk Standards Working Group
makes no secret of its goals, agenda and the issues addressed. In a nutshell
this is a much broader document on risk than its predecessors, because it
reaches far beyond just derivatives to address all types of investment vehicles.
It addresses risk from the perspectives of the fiduciary and oversight managers,
regarding the monitoring of external managers, portfolio pricing and asset
valuations. It is also very light on rules and dogmatic pronouncements.
"We wanted to create a public domain document that investors could
use as a benchmark, a goal, even a checklist if you will, to look at those
risk exposures that came up on the radar screens of this group," says
participant Christopher J. Campisano, manager of trust investments at Xerox.
" A large part of my motivation was to go through the exercise of analysis
with my peers."
Much of the material asks basic questions like: a) Do you have risk-adjusted
performance measures and attribution analysis, or b) Do you have risk limits,
stress testing and back-testing? or c) Have you considered model risk? The
document also leaves no contingent risk exposure unexplored. "It is
a bunch of risk-awareness tools rather than rules," says Jon Lukomnik,
Deputy Comptroller of the City of New York. "I can tell you that we
in New York City don't comply with all the guidelines, and I suspect no
fund does. These are goals-I want to make that clear."
The group hopes that the document will educate and also make some aspects
of derivatives and other risks more respectable. "Now institutional
investors will have a document that they can take to their boards,"
says Richard Rose, chief investment officer at the San Diego County Employee
Retirement Association. "We hope it will be the groundwork for generally
accepted standards. After two to three years of two-inch headlines of horrific
investment losses, my sense is that pension boards or committees have taken
the approach that if anyone on the staff mentions derivatives they'll just
go nuts. They'll say we can't afford that kind of publicity and so on. But
having a set of risk standards that are embraced by other boards should
raise their comfort levels. If we can show that controls are in place to
prevent an Orange County, then the boards may listen to some of the more
innovative things that the staff is proposing that could help add value
to the fund."
Another of this document's possible social utilities: investors can use
it as a weapon to control their independent managers. "As a result
of greater awareness and consciousness on the part of the institutional
investors it will be in the manager's best interest to address these standards,"
says James Seymour, vice president of The Common Fund. "This is putting
notice out in the community that there is a large group of investors who
feel that standards should be much more stringent and better defined."
Eternal fears
The initial meeting of the group dealt with a set of concerns regarding
externally managed investment portfolios that were largely raised by Michael
deMarco, director of risk management at GTE, whose pension fund is two thirds
managed externally, and which had already been working on some guidelines
for these managers' use of derivatives. "We make considerable use of
derivatives internally and externally," he says. "The heightened
level of public attention to derivatives and derivatives-based strategies
raised the perception at GTE of the need for some more formal risk management
process."
Subsequent meetings addressed the risk aspects of internally managed
funds and then brainstormed into a wide range of contingencies from the
fiduciary perspective. And some of the possibilities considered were relatively
far out, like a manager's backup and disaster recovery plans. "Let's
say I hire an equity manager in San Francisco," theorizes Campisano.
"There is an earthquake. The manager comes to work next morning and
the building is gone-no systems, no nothing-and by the way the market is
down 150 points. So I'm exposed to a risk and I need to know before the
event takes place that managers have disaster recovery plans that will allow
them to continue to manage those assets."
Yet another risk contingency that the group discussed: securities lending.
"There are many plan sponsors that engage in securities lending,"
Campisano continues. "For them the issue is how deeply should they
look through the securities lending function and understand where the value-added
is coming from. Is it from the ability to negotiate a superior rebate rate
or from aggressively investing the underlying cash collateral? Investors
need to drill down and study potential loss scenarios from securities lending
and determine what risks are acceptable."
Local Govs Warned
Almost a year ago the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA)
tried to raise the alarms on derivatives-using state and local governments,
which could be waiving some of their rights if they agreed to the voluntary
guidelines in the New York Fed's "Principles and Practices for Wholesale
Financial Transactions." The GFOA, along with the National Association
of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers, plus the National Association
of State Treasurers, warned that broker-dealers are under no obligation
to tell customers if they followed the principles and practices or not,
and that broker-dealers have no obligation to opine on the suitability of
derivative or other investments.
Since then the GFOA has kept up the pressure on the broker-dealer community.
It has published and sent out to state and local governments 2,000 copies
of a sample investment policy statement, which has been of considerable
influence in those states where legislatures have mandated investment policies-for
example, Wisconsin, Texas, California, Ohio and, notably, Maryland. The
GFOA is particularly keen to spread its own written version of ideal brokerdealer
agreements, in part because of concern that sellers of derivatives could
be framing these documents partly to nullify the effects of legislative
toughening and in ways that country rubes might not catch.
Texas is a case in point. There broker-dealers are trying to float a
standardized agreement that local governments can sign off on, claiming
that they are acting pursuant to the tough restrictions imposed last February
by the legislature. "The act, however, doesn't require it," notes
Betsy Dotson, assistant director/legislative counsel of the GFOA's legislative
arm. "We are concerned that in cases like Texas the standard agreement
negotiated with the broker-dealer community may lead to public investors
giving up more than they need to." Her warning to government end-users:
"Don't sign off thinking that it is the same language as before. What
the broker-dealer industry was not able to achieve legislatively, they will
work to put into their version of standard documents."
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