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Mortgage-Backeds
Watch that Prepayment Model Risk!
Teri Geske, vice president of product development at Capital
Management Sciences, Inc., warns what can happen to your portfolio when
your model's prepayment assumptions go awry.
Predicting human behavior is one of the toughest challenges around. Take
mortgage pre-payment as a pretty arcane but good example. Whether or not
a mortgage-holder chooses to refinance should be based on some clear, obvious
financial criteria, such as interest rates, no? Well, no. It turns out that
interest rates are only a small piece of the puzzle. Sometimes people just
don't get around to refinancing when rates are favorable. Or a householder
anticipating an upcoming sale and relocation might actually pre-pay the
mortgage at an unfavorable rate. Even the seasons-and the weather-seem sometimes
to have bizarre effects on mortgage pre-payment patterns.
Consequently, it is almost impossible to develop a model that accurately
predicts mortage pre-payment. The best we can do is analyze data from the
past-and simply hope that it be a guide to the future. Sometimes that hope
is foolish. History is littered with cases where mortgage portfolios have
gone underwater with a seemingly capricious change in pre-payment rates.
Thus any sound valuation of a portfolio of mortgage-backed securities must
take into account; 1) the model's prepayment assumptions; and 2) the portfolio's
likely behavior should those assumptions turn out to be flawed.
This article will discuss pre-payment risk in the mortgage market, and
how it factors into models. We shall also discuss a method for identifying
portfolios' sensitivity to pre-payment uncertainty.
MBS 101
Most of us learned in Securities Analysis 101 that a bond's price is
equal to the present value of its expected future cashflows. This is a
straightforward exercise in discounting when bonds have no embedded options.
However securities with call or put options require some type of option
model to determine expected future cashflows under different interest rate
environments. For corporate bonds with embedded call options, valuation
models typically assume that a corporation will make a rational decision
about whether or not to call-i.e., if interest rates fall and the bond's
price rises above its call price, the company will call the issue.
Financial models typically assume that an investor will exercise an embedded put option only when it is optimal to do so, and will never put the bond
back to the issuer at par if the bond's price is greater than 100. However,
although mortgages by nature are optional, since the homeowner has the option
to prepay, one cannot make the same assumptions about rational economic
behavior. Homeowners will sometimes fail to exercise a call which is in-the-money,
or exercise a put which is out-of-the-money.
When valuing mortgage-backed securities (both pass-through mortgage pools
and CMOs), model designers face the problem of forecasting the amount and
timing of prepayments in order to find the present value of expected future
cashflows. They often handle the problem differently. Each of various mortgage
research departments on Wall Street have their own prepayment models on
the assumptions they find credible. The result is that there often is a
huge difference in these firms' price quotes for a given CMO tranche.
Most models incorporate mounds of historic data about the average number
of months to maturity and average loan rate of various mortgage pools which
prepaid in the past, the time of year in which the prepayments occurred,
and other variables. Therefore prepayment models implicitly expect homeowners
to behave in the future as they have in the past-not necessarily a bad assumption,
but not always an accurate one. Last December, for example, statistics showed
an acceleration of prepayments, contrary to conventional wisdom which states
that prepayments slow down in the winter and speed up in the summer.
The impact of revised prepayment expectations on the valuation of mortgage-backed securities constitutes an additional source of risk to investors which is
not captured by standard valuation measures. Since the theoretical price
that a model will compute for a mortgage-backed security depends heavily
upon the prepayment model used to forecast future cashflows, an investor
should be aware of how sensitive the valuation is to a change in the model's
prepayment forecasts. Put differently, investors should ask themselves how
the price would be affected if homeowners' current behavior turns out to
differ from the data used to build the prepayment model.
Considering Prepayment Uncertainty
Prepayment uncertainty measures address these questions by gauging the
sensitivity of a mortgage-backed security's price to a change in a model's
prepayment estimates. Such measures operates on the assumption that risk
analysis must go beyond interest rate risk measurement to other sources
of risk which impact mortgage-backed securities. While prepayment uncertainty
has been discussed in academia, and also by some Wall Street mortgage analysts,
as yet there are few analytical tools of this type used by investors.
My firm, Capital Management Sciences(CMS) has developed a BondEdge system, in which prepayment uncertainty is defined as the sensitivity of a mortgage-backed
security's price to a 10 percent change in the level of those prepayment
speeds projected by a prepayment model. To calculate this measure, alternative
sets of cashflows for the mortgage-backed security are created by shifting
each standard monthly mortality rate generated by our prepayment model,
either upward and downward by 10 percent. Based on the original option-adjusted
spread that has been calculated for the security, two new prices are then
computed using the slower and faster prepayment estimates.
The average percentage change in these prices, when compared to the starting price is our prepayment uncertainty measure. For example, if a prepayment
model predicts that FNMA 8.00 percent moderately seasoned collateral will
exhibit a weighted average remaining lifetime prepayment speed of 220 percent
PSA, it is useful to know what would happen to the price of a CMO tranche
backed by this collateral if prepayment estimates were revised downward
or upward by 22 percent PSA. An overall prepayment uncertainty of +0.20
indicates that a security's price will increase (decrease) by 0.2 percent
if all projected prepayment rates are revised downward (upward) by 10 percent.
In many situations, investors might be less concerned with the possibility of an overall change in prepayment patterns and more concerned at a change
in homeowners' refinancing behavior. As homeowners become more savvy about
refinancing opportunities and mortgage lenders become more aggressive in
offering low-fee and no-fee loans, a mortgage-backed securities investor
should want to know how sensitive the price of a CMO is to a change in the
refinancing component of a prepayment model.
Our model also derives a partial prepayment uncertainty measure based
on a +/- 10 percent scaling of the refinancing incentive component of each
standard monthly mortality rate predicted by the prepayment model. The
calculation is otherwise analogous to the overall prepayment uncertainty.
To complete the picture, we also compute a partial prepayment uncertainty
measure (to address householders who will prepay in anticipation of a move)
which quantifies the exposure to revisions of the projected baseline prepayment
rate-the number which expresses the fact that regardless of the interest
rate environment a certain number of mortgages will be prepaid each year.
Risky CMO Tranches
While almost all types of mortgage-backed securities have some degree
of sensitivity to a change in prepayment estimates, the prepayment uncertainty
measures for some risky CMO tranches can attain much higher positive and
negative values than for straight pass-throughs. Alternatively, VADMs and
well-structured PACs may exhibit much less prepayment uncertainty than pass-throughs
of the same collateral type. The following table shows the prepayment uncertainty
measures for different CMO tranche types:
The benefits
Prepayment uncertainty measures provide an additional dimension to investment analysis. They complement other measures such as effective duration and
convexity, the primary measures of interest rate risk. Prepayment uncertainty
can assist investors with trading decisions on a single security basis,
since differences in prepayment uncertainty may explain why two securities
with seemingly similar characteristics have different option adjusted spreads
and offer different risk/return profiles. At the portfolio level prepayment
uncertainty measures allow managers to manage exposure to the unavoidable
uncertainty embedded in all prepayment models. So even if we can't predict
the behavior of those consistently inconsistent householders, we can at
least minimize exposure to their perplexing behavior.
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